mean modern symbolic logic. It is well known that the laws of Aristotelian logic are valid only if all the terms refer to non-empty sets.
Traditional Aristotelian logic recognizes four types of sentences A:
All F are G E:
No F is G I:
Some F are G O:
Some F are not G Certain relationships are said to hold between these types. For example A and E are contraries. It means that both cannot be true, but both can be false.
Here the modern logicians spotted a problem. Suppose that we interpret the four types as in Table 1 below.
(∃x) (Fx & ~Gx) (Strawson, 1952, pp. 163-179) He showed that given the interpretation below Table 2 all the laws of the traditional syllogism will hold. (Strawson, 1952, p. 173) Traditional logic assumes that the subject term refers to something that does exist. However, the formulae in Table 2 are implausible translations of the natural language sentences. (Strawson, 1952, p. 173 Such a logic can be formalized. This can be accomplished by generalizing truth-relevant logic (Diaz, 1981) to the predicate calculus. In this logic the
are not truth-relevant tautologies (Diaz, 1981, p. 67.) Similarly in Strawson's logic the sentences
are not true if ~(∃x)Fx. (Nor are they false.)
The author of truth-relevant logic probably never realized that his system was a propositional counterpart of the traditional Aristotelian logic! He arrived at it from a different angle, the angle of relevance. But truth-relevant logic can be extended not only to monadic predicate calculus but also to the logic of relations. (Newberry, 2014) * * * * *
Let us now turn our attention to the diagonal lemma and in particular to
Gödel's theorem. In Peano Arithmetic there exists a decidable relation Diag(y,z) such that if y is the Gödel number of a formula with one free variable then z is the Gödel number number of the formula obtained from y by substituting (the numeral of) the Gödel number of y for the free variable in y.
Further let Prf(x,z) be a predicate such that x is the Gödel number of a sequence that is a proof of the sentence with Gödel number z. Then consider the formula
with one free variable y. Let the constant k be the Gödel number of U. We substitute k for the free variable y in U. We obtain
As a result of this construction Diag(k,z) is satisfied only by the Gödel number of G. We will denote the Gödel number of G as '<G>'. Then according to classical logic G is equivalent tõ
and thus
The sentence (J) above is an instance of the diagonal lemma also known as the fixed point theorem. We replaced the free variable z in ~(∃x) Prf(x,z) with the Gödel number of some sentence φ such that φ ↔ ~(∃x) Prf(x,<φ>) . In this case φ happens to be G.
Now we are coming to the crux of the matter. Let us "unroll" G:
. . .
For any n either ~(∃x) (Prf(x,n) or ~(∃x) Diag(k, n) . Given the following
we find that if n = <G> then
is vacuous. So let n = <G>:
~(∃x)(Prf(x,<G>) & Diag(k,<G>)) (K)
According to the logic of presuppositions both terms in K must refer to nonempty sets. In particular (∃x)Prf(x,<G>) must hold; it is a presupposition of K.
That is, if ~(∃x)Prf(x,<G>) then K cannot be true! The equivalence J no longer holds. By cutting the Gordian knot we are able to say that G is not true even though G cannot say it of itself.
